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ABSTRACT
Minimal local resources, lack of consistency in low level protocols and market pressures contribute to IoT devices
being more vulnerable than traditional computing devices. These devices not only have a wide variety of processors
and implementations, but they often serve di↵erent purposes and generate unique network tra c. Current IoT network
security solutions fail to account for and handle both the scale at which IoT devices can be deployed and the heteroge-
neous nature of the tra c they produce. In order to accommodate these di↵erences and improve on current solutions,
we propose the implementation of a microsegmented firewall for IoT networks. Unlike traditional microsegmented
architectures, which use a virtual management layer and hypervisors to manage, route, and filter the tra c from VMs,
we propose the use of a cloud based management layer working in cooperation with fog node filters to manage end
device tra c. The fog nodes act as the first hop from the IoT devices, filtering tra c according to the rules given to
them by the management layer. This decreases packet filtering latency by distributing the computing load and limiting
the number of hops packets make for processing. Meanwhile, having a singular management point gives network
administrators the convenience of controlling all tra c flows at a moments notice as would be the case in a traditional
SDN. As a result, this architecture promotes both the adaptability and scalability needed in IoT networks, all while
securing tra c flows and minimizing latency.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
While IoT devices prove much more vulnerable than traditional computing devices, they are just as valuable for
attackers. Many factors make traditional security measures less e↵ective when applied in an IoT setting. Minimal
local resources cause IoT devices to not be able to physically handle the computational demands of modern intrusion
detection software. Lack of consistency in low-level protocols, like how devices receive updates, means a ones size fits
all solution will not work in the IoT space. Finally, market pressures to produce cheap devices and beat competitors
to market encourages companies to skip necessary security precautions and testing procedures. Once an attacker
compromises an IoT device, it may be used as a valuable tool to carry out further attacks within the local network or
act as a bot in a zombie-style attack. Network security for IoT devices is very di↵erent than traditional computing
devices for two main reasons. First, IoT devices can be deployed in much greater scale than traditional computing
devices. This means that a network security solution needs the bandwidth and flexibility to deal with thousands of
unique devices that are communicating inside and out of the network. Second, these devices often serve di↵erent
purposes and generate unique patterns of network tra c. Current IoT network security solutions solve some of the
issues we present, however, none are able to handle both the scale at which IoT devices can be deployed and the
heterogeneous nature of the tra c they produce.
One current solution utilizes a private cloud to both manage policy and enforce firewall rules (1). The private cloud
solution o✏oads the complexity of securing numerous heterogeneous IoT devices, while providing the convenience
of a singular management point. However, in this architecture, all tra c must go through the private cloud for packet
processing. This creates a bottleneck, reducing the throughput of the system. More importantly, it creates a single point
of failure where in the event that the private cloud becomes unavailable the end devices it protects must either stop
receiving tra c or risk vulnerability. Another existing architecture uses an array of dedicated hubs which individually
store the firewall rules that they enforce (2). The hub solution is another example of an architecture which successfully
o✏oads the computational load of security software onto devices with more available resources. It provides the
performance advantages of distributing computational load and the redundancy that the private cloud solution fails to.
1
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Unfortunately, due to the fact that administrators must program policy into the hubs manually, the hub architecture is
not scalable. Additionally, creating policy for individual heterogeneous devices is also more costly in this architecture
as this work must be done for each hub. It is important to note that the security of both architectures depends heavily
on e↵ective management from network administrators.
In order to incorporate the benefits of both of these architectures while also eliminating their shortcomings, we
propose the implementation of a SDN architecture adapted for an IoT environment. Instead of the traditional virtual
management layer and hypervisors which manage, route, and filter the tra c in the SDN context, the proposed solution
uses a cloud management layer with fog policy enforcement nodes to protect the end devices. The cloud acts as the
management layer. This means it is responsible for propagating new security rules to the fog nodes. It also receives
updates and statuses from these fog nodes, giving administrators the ability to analyze their system from both a birds
eye view and at a granular level. The fog nodes act as the first hop from the IoT devices, filtering tra c and enforcing
policy that the network administrator defines in the cloud management layer. Having enforcement in a local fog node
gives the proposed solution a distinct performance advantage. Having multiple fog nodes allows us to distribute the
computational load, while the one hop nature of our local fog node reduces latency. The combination of these reduces
latency and increases throughput. Having enforcement occur at the fog node also provides increased security by giving
administrators the ability to filter both east-west and north-south tra c. Similar to the SDN architecture it is based on,
the biggest advantage of the proposed solution is how it scales and adapts to a dynamic network topology. Therefore,
the proposed architecture benefits those who utilize a large network of heterogeneous IoT devices like warehouses
and factories. By better protecting any consumers that trust their data with a company that uses IoT devices at this
scale, and increasing the the throughput of these devices, the proposed architecture provides an environment where
IoT networks can continue to scale. In order to show how the proposed solution performs quantitatively, we measure
it’s latency, memory usage, accessibility and scalability. As we will discuss later, our team was limited to a virtual
testbed which made testing things like latency a challenge. However, we were able to overcome this and are excited
to share our results.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we discuss the contributions and gaps of existing
work. In Chapter 3, we give a more comprehensive and detailed look at the proposed system. In Chapter 4, we show
how we built a prototype of the proposed architecture. In Chapter 5, we present and discuss our results. In Chapter
6, we propose next steps and potential enhancements to the proposed solution. In Chapter 7, we analyze the ethical,
environmental and human impacts of the architecture.
2
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Chapter 2
Related Work
In (2) an invention is proposed where all local IoT tra c is routed through a ”network hub”. This network hub
inspects inbound and outbound tra c and compares it against firewall rules. It then drops or forwards tra c based on
the firewall policy. In this invention, it is proposed to use the network hub as a both a router/gateway and a firewall for
the IoT devices connected to it. This novel invention allows for high speed packet processing by keeping the devices
close the IoT devices it protects. However, the main drawback to this invention is that network administrators must
program the firewall policy into the hubs manually. This limits the invention’s scalability as any policy changes can
only be propagated as quickly as can be programmed by network administrators. While administrators may write
their own scripts to automate this process, the invention does not provide a secure a way to quickly propagate policy
changes. We expand on this invention by uniting multiple network hubs under a management layer. This allows
for larger scale deployment both from a device number and geographic spread perspective as policy change can be
e↵ected on any number of network hubs from any location where the network administrator has secure access to the
management. Additionally, by uniting various local hubs, our team’s proposed solution opens up the opportunity to
inspect not only north-south tra c, but also east-west tra c within the topology.
In (1) an invention is proposed where a private cloud is solely responsible for securing all IoT devices. In this
invention new IoT devices go through an onboarding process before the private cloud accepts them and manages them
as part of the broader network. This consists of first authenticating the device and then identifying the device type
and assigning it a profile. This profile contains both static data about the device, and dynamic data which the cloud
tracks and stores in the profile. The profile determines how the private cloud will regulate the flow of data to and from
the IoT device. In the case that the device is authenticated but unable to be indentified, then the device is considered
unknown and is placed in an unproven device zone. By managing all IoT devices on a private cloud, response time
and bandwidth become issues in large scale applications. While the inventors mention use IoT firewalls, they do so
only during the authentication stage. As a result, all tra c to and from IoT devices on the private network must first
be routed through the private cloud that manages them. This leads to both a bottleneck in terms of performance and
3
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a single point of failure. To address this gap, we plan on moving the computation and routing from the cloud layer
down to the fog layer. This distributes the computational load of packet processing and expedites the process of tra c
inspection, but still gives us the advantage of a central management point.
The authors of (3) give an overview of some issues, challenges, and future initiatives in fog-enabled IoT services.
This paper also goes on to discuss and present an orchestration scenario using a distributed genetic algorithm. This
paper is relevant to our research as it describes in detail and eventually demonstrates the benefits of using an IoT end
device to fog to cloud architecture. In a more traditional web-based service, a central cloud will provide the compute
resources to receive, process, store, and transmit the data. When it comes to real-time, high bandwidth applications
the transmitting this data becomes a limitation. The authors show that by preprocessing the data in the fog nodes
prior to sending it to the cloud, the rate of transmission can be reduced while also increasing the reliability of these
same transmissions. The paper goes on to break down the problem of IoT orchestration into four categories: Scale
and Complexity, Security Critically, Dynamicity, and Fault Diagnosis & Tolerance. Additionally, this paper analyzes
component selection and placement and how it impacts quality of service and security of the IoT architecture. It
describes the benefits of deploying across multiple locations and data centers, as well as orchestration algorithms for
calculating optimal deployment. The authors then take this a step further with dynamic orchestration. By conducting
real-time monitoring for quality of service and accuracy, the authors suggest that reallocating task execution and
resources is a must throughout a deployment lifecycle. Finally, due to the complex nature of orchestration algorithms,
it is suggested that incremental computation is typically necessary. While this paper goes in depth as to the benefits of
fog computing and ways used to optimize deployment, it does not touch on the security applications of fog computing
that we would like to capitalize in this research. We can leverage the advantages discussed in (3), to construct a
distributed firewall for IoT applications.
In (4) many types of attacks (DDoS, location high jacking, and link overloading) are tested on di↵erent SDN con-
trollers in order to demonstrate that, by default, SDNs and SDN controllers are vulnerable to attacks. This underscores
the point that using an SDN type of defense, like a DFW, still depends heavily on the implementation of such technol-
ogy. This paper also goes to show the benefits of implementing multiple overlapping security defenses as opposed to
relying on just one.
In (5), the authors discuss how a dynamic distributed firewall can benefit a network. They propose decoupling a
firewall controller from the data plane and allowing a centralized manager to oversee all clusters in the network. The
cluster head handles communications and distributes firewall rules. This is similar to the proposed architecture as we
have our centralized manager in the cloud dictating policy while our fog nodes store and enforce the firewall rules.
In (6), a solution called middlebox-guard is proposed to act as an improved middlebox in a SDN architecture.
This middlebox-guard aims to both reduce network latency while also properly managing network tra c securely.
The authors tackle load balancing problems as well as firewall policy for this distributed context. This relates to
4
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our research as one of our main goals is reducing latency and securing networks by distributing the computational
workload of firewall policy enforcement. Our research aims to bring concepts like this one into a physical space where
real-time hardware like sensors make up the network.
In (7), the authors focus on IoT vulnerabilities. Specifically, they look at the lack of cohesion between the state
machines of the three entities within a smarthome or IoT network: the cloud, the device, and an application for data
management. By configuring a man-in-the-middle (MITM) device and doing packet analysis, the authors are able
to implement a ”phantom device” security breach. Here the authors take a malicious device and give it the identity
of a real device, thus triggering unexpected and potentially harmful state transitions in the IoT network. Noteworthy
examples include hijacking a device when it fails to reset/unbind from the network properly, and gathering supposedly
secret device ids from the network when issuing a command at the right stage of a cloud’s state machine. This research
is evidence of the shortcomings of current IoT security solutions which the proposed system looks to resolve.
5
DocuSign Envelope ID: B42117EB-F447-4716-BE0D-BAB96FB7CEEF
Chapter 3
System Overview
To achieve security and optimal latency, we propose a system architecture (see Figure 3.1) consisting of three di↵erent
layers: (1) A cloud-based management layer, (2) a fog node layer, and (3) an end device layer. This system is based
on the fundamentals of software defined networking (SDN) and combines the benefits that current solutions like the
network hub and private cloud control provide. SDNs are critical in today’s network infrastructure. Having become
the optimal choice for data center networking due to their adaptability, the proposed system looks to bring these same
benefits to IoT networking. Since the devices that are connected to these networks are often changing, it is necessary
to have a network that can be dynamically configured, programmed, and scaled to suit the user’s needs. Figure 3.2
shows the typical layers of a SDN and it mirrors the proposed system’s layout. The application layer is represented
by a command line interface that a network engineer can use to configure the proposed system, the controller layer is
represented by the cloud-based management layer, and the data plane layer is represented by the fog node and the end
device layer.
In order to build a proof-of-concept of this architecture, we designate specific tasks for each layer. First, the
cloud-based management layer, specifically the command line interface, acts as the user facing layer of the network.
Through the command line interface, the network administrator views network statistics and configures the network.
The management layer accesses information regarding the end devices and its tra c patterns. It also propagates new
firewall rules to the fog nodes as needed.
Second, the fog node layer acts as the enforcement layer between the end devices and the network as a whole. It
routes any network information back up to the management layer. In other words, this layer acts as a configurable
network switch with its own firewall.
Third, the end device layer hosts all the IoT devices of the network. Each device connects to a fog node, and any
communication horizontally or vertically in the network is routed through these fog nodes.
A number of technologies are utilized in this architecture. In our physical testbed, we use a Raspberry Pi Model
3 Bs to act as the end devices. Raspberry Pis are single board computers that can connect to various I/O sensors and
6
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Figure 3.1: System Architecture. The three layers of the proposed system: end device layer, fog node layer, cloud-
based management
devices. Therefore, they are ideal for simulating di↵erent kinds of tra c to mimic the heterogeneous nature of IoT.
We use Intel’s ”Next Unit of Computing” or NUC for the fog node and the cloud-based management layers. A mini
PC is low cost, low power, and low latency, which allows them to scale well in a large network. In order to make
the proposed solution widely accessible, we opted to not only use a↵ordable hardware, but also to implement the
proposed system entirely with open source software. Figure 4.2 shows the technology that we use in the proof-of-
concept implementation of the proposed system and where each technology resides in the proposed architecture. Here
readers will see we use Open Daylight on one NUC to act as the cloud management node, Open vSwitch on another
NUC to act as the fog layer, and install tra c generation software on the end device layer. It is important to note
that for the end device layer. Any device with any hardware specification can be used so long as it can send packets.
The proposed solution is designed to handle and protect devices without the devices needing software protections
themselves.
We use the popular Open Daylight (ODL) SDN controller to handle the packet routing in the fog node. It is
java-based, which means that it performs relatively faster than controllers like as Ryu, that are python-based. ODL
has both northbound and southbound APIs which allow easy configures between multiple software. For simplicity,
we focused on using ODL’s northbound REST API and a couple of its southbound APIs, like OVSDB and Openflow.
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Figure 3.2: General layout of software defined networks
ODL supports the Openflow protocol, which is key to creating a firewall. Openflow rules are stored in forwarding
tables or Openflow tables. These rules match incoming packets, and execute an action based on the rules, which can
range from simple forwarding to dropped packets.
Through its southbound API, OVSDB, ODL communicates with Open vSwitch (OvS). OvS is a software defined
virtualized switch. OvS stores the Openflow tables, acting as the firewall securing the end devices. OvS interprets the
Openflow rules propagated from ODL and routes tra c based on these tables, as seen in Figure 3.3.
We also built on ODL’s northbound REST API for the proof-of-concept implementation. We constructed Openflow
rules using this API, as well as queried ODL’s operational datastore for information. After sending these API calls to
ODL’s configuration datastore, ODL pushes any valid Openflow rules into its operational side, which gets forwarded
to the appropriate open vSwitch. These API calls were initially constructed and sent through Postman, which is an
application that provides an easy to use platform to construct and collaborate on APIs. In addition, Postman o↵ers
a Python skeleton for any API calls that are constructed, which we used to initially build the main command line
interface.
8
DocuSign Envelope ID: B42117EB-F447-4716-BE0D-BAB96FB7CEEF
x
O e S c
F Tab e
Ma c Ac
C e
I c
Pac e
Ac
E ced
O e F P c
Figure 3.3: Openflow and OvS Interaction. How openflow protocol acts as a firewall within OvS
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Chapter 4
Implementation
As briefly described in the System Overview, we intended to build on top of low cost resources, such as mini pcs
and Raspberry Pis. Due to unforeseen circumstances brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic, we lost access to our
physical testbed, and were unable to set up the remainder of our devices in order to build a full, proof of concept
network. Since aforementioned hardware specifications were a large component to the proposed system’s novelty
and usefulness, we decided to replicate our physical testbed in a virtual environment. We used virtual machines and
containers with the memory and resource constraints that exist on our selected hardware. In order to emulate our
physical testbed in a virtual environment, we used the GNS3 graphical network simulator. In GNS3, virtual machines
were used for the cloud layer and the fog node layer, and Docker containers were used for the end devices. GNS3
was our preferred choice for its simple graphical user interface and for its proprietary GNS3 VM, which optimizes for
nested virtualization, allowing us to create our desired testbed.
4.1 Software
We used the most recent and stable version of ODL as of February 2020, the 11th release, which is ODL Sodium SR2.
Similarly, we installed the most recent and stable version of OvS as of February 2020. OvS requires a database and
daemon to start, which can be created via OvS commands. There are built in utilities to configure the switch, one
of which, configures a controller. Knowing the IP address that ODL is living on and which default port that ODL
is listening on, are the two pieces of information needed. The default port is dependent on which version of ODL is
running. The IP address for OvS is also necessary for configuration.
First, we had to configure each piece of software and install the necessary packages. The following commands
were run on the virtual machine running Open Daylight, from package installation to starting the ODL console.
apt-get update -y
apt-get upgrade -y
apt-get install net-tools iperf default-jre-headless -y
export JAVA HOME=/usr/lib/jvm/default-java
10
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Figure 4.1: Testbench topology implemented in GNS3
./opendaylight-0.11.2/bin/karaf
features:install <insert feature>
In order to use ODL’s OVSDB and OpenFlow southbound plugins, a number of features need to be installed on the
software. Out of the hundreds of di↵erent features, a list of these features that we installed are shown here.
odl-restconf-all
odl-ovsdb-library
odl-ovsdb-southbound-impl-ui
odl-ovsdb-southbound-api
odl-ovsdb-southbound-impl-rest
odl-ovsdb-southbound-impl-test
odl-ovsdb-hwvtepsouthbound-ui
odl-ovsdb-hwvtepsouthbound
odl-ovsdb-hwvtepsouthbound-test
odl-openflowplugin-flow-services-rest
odl-openflowplugin-app-table-miss-enforcer
odl-openflowplugin-app-topology-lldp-discover
odl-netvirt-openstack
odl-sfc-ovs
11
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odl-openflowplugin-app-southbound-cli
The following commands were run on the virtual machine running Open vSwitch for package installation and
configuration.
apt-get install net-tools iperf automake libtool make -y
cd openvswitch
./boot.sh
./configure
make
make install
export PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/share/openvswitch/scripts
sudo /usr/local/share/openvswitch/scripts/ovs-ctl start
Finally, the following commands were run on the network admin VM, which hosts the python command line
interface.
apt-get install git vim python python-pip net-tools iperf -y
git clone https://github.com/agiannif/IoTDFW-C.git
cd IoTDFW
pip install requests
python odl.py
We established connections between OvS, ODL, and our own machine that runs Postman. In order to use Postman
to draft the API calls on our own machine, and pass along calls to the NUC that was hosting ODL, we used NodeJS
to open a proxy to the listening port that we opened when we first remote logged into ODL. However, as we made
iterations and improvments to the proposed system, we translated these Postman API calls into our a Python script.
Using two di↵erent methods, we were able to establish ODL as the OvS controller. One option was to use the built in
ovs-vsctl suite in open vSwitch.
ovs-vsctl add-br br0
ovs-vsctl add-port br0 enp0s8
ovs-vsctl add-port br0 enp0s9
ovs-vsctl add-port br0 enp0s10
ovs-vsctl set-controller br0 tcp:<ip address of ODL VM>:6633
The other option was to use the ODL REST API to push information from ODL’s configuration datastore, to its
operational datastore, and then to open vSwitch. In other words, either OvS was passive or ODL was passive, but
either method provided a suitable connection.
We used the GNS3 Ubuntu Docker Guests appliance for our containers. This was the quickest and easiest solution
for bringing containers into our testbed, as creating a container appliance within GNS3 requires a decent amount of
work which may serve as a barrier for anyone looking to test our architecture on their network using GNS3. The
12
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Figure 4.2: Technology used throughout system.
GNS3 developers configured these containers so that they are optimized for both GNS3 and virtualized networking.
However, they do not contain the tra c generation software nmap which is what we used to generate tra c. Typically,
the best practice would be to create a Dockerfile with the GNS3 Ubuntu Docker Guest specifications, and add nmap to
it. Unfortunately, we do not have access to the GNS3 Dockerfile, so this is not an option. Instead, we used bash scripts
to both install our desired software and generate our tra c. The ideal solution would be to create a Docker Container
appliance with these specifications, so that users can easily grab it from the GNS3 marketplace when building their
testbeds from the proposed architecture.
4.2 Propagate Rules
The cloud based management layer is where propagation occurs. Once ODL is the controller of OvS, ODL’s default
flow tables, containing the Openflow rules, are propagated onto OvS. New rules are constructed with raw XML or
JSON data, which are sent as API calls to ODL. This process to create rules can be done manually, through Postman,
or automatically, through our command line interface. Although the proposed system hosts the management layer
and the network admin machine in the local GNS3 network, theoretically, these components can be hosted outside the
local network. However, we did not have enough time to test this in our virtualized testbed. Our goal for the future
13
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is to be able to propagate rules via the WAN. We would enforce stricter credentials when accessing ODL and data
encryption for the API calls, to accomplish this.
4.3 Openflow Protocol
Each OvS instance can contain a varying number of Openflow tables and each Openflow table can hold a varying
number of rules, which abides by the Openflow protocol. For simplicity we only worked with one table, however, for
real life applications it is recommended to group rules together on di↵erent tables based on network layers, priorities,
etc, for more complex network structures.
A basic Openflow rule consists of a number of customized parameters, depending on its protocol version. We used
Openflow version 1.3 for the proposed system. We dumped the flows from the connected OvS to show the basic fields
within a rule. There are fields that identify individual flows, such as a flow identification number, cookies, and which
flow table it belongs to. There are also matching fields, such as IP addresses, MAC addresses, port numbers, etc. that
will match to corresponding tra c. Lastly, there are action fields that execute actions once a flow is matched, and
this can range from the packet being dropped, to being forwarded to a specific port, to being modified in some way.
Examples of these various fields are listed below.
cookie=0x0
duration=353.22 s
table=0
n packets=0
n bytes=0
priority=36000
ip, nw src=192.168.122.3 nw dst=192.168.122.2
actions=NORMAL
There are also sections of a flow that can be used to monitor for any suspicious behavior in the network. For
example, duration time can be important to monitor. If a network suddenly goes down, a network admin should check
the flows with the smallest active duration time, since it is these newer flows that brought down the network. If the
number of packets that are matched in a specific rule is very large compared to surrounding flows, it may be worth to
delete that flow and remove any device associated with it, as a large amount of matched packets may indicate that a
denial of service attack is occurring.
4.4 Enforce Rules
As established previously, OvS acts as a switch that forwards tra c between end devices, so enforcement occurs at
the fog level. Once the highest prioritized flow is matched, the action associated with that flow rule is executed by the
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fog node, whether it be forwarding, dropping, or some type of modification to the packet. In order to see clear results
forthe proposed system, we kept the action to be either normal forwarding, or dropping. OvS contains over a hundred
tables, that may be configured for the network. Table 0 is the starting point of matching, and once a flow matches, one
action could be to forward the packet to another table for additional matching. Multiple tables and chains of flow rules
lend to more complex matching, e ciency, and organization.
4.5 Command Line Interface
As mentioned previously, we transitioned from using Postman to programming everything in Python. To make config-
uration and network monitoring easy for network admins, we built a command line interface (CLI), with easy-to-use
commands. The CLI is built in Python since the language has built in packages to help send API requests and interpret
JSON and XML formatted data. Python also lends to faster scripting and prototyping, which is important for the
timeline of this project.
These commands ask for the fields to construct an API call, such as the IP address of the host that is running ODL,
the node id of OvS, any necessary flow table ids and/or flow ids, etc.. This is compared to Postman, which has the user
manually enter all the fields of a REST API call, including the URL. The CLI syntactically constructs the call for the
user, and does not require the user to know the ins and outs of Open Daylight or Open vSwitch. The command line
interface abstracts away the complexities of this SDN system by providing options that a network admin can choose
from, as shown here.
0. exit program
1. print menu
2. see flow table
3. add flow to fog node
4. del flow from fog node
5. see flow table statistics
6. see all fog nodes connected
7. see all groups
8. add fog node to group
9. del fog node from group
10. add flow to group
11. del flow from group
enter option:
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4.6 Groups
In order to expedite the process of assigning Openflow rules, the user can use the CLI to create groups based on fog
nodes. Groups are our first step towards a more intent based network configuration approach. Once fog nodes with
similar functions are assigned to the same group, the user can simply push rules based on that groups name, which
creates consistent policies within the network.
4.7 Testing
In order to test the proof of concept implementation, we generate tra c to test our network functionality. We use nmap
for this, installing it on each of our end devices. Nmap comes with a built in tool, nping, which contains a suite of
commands which generate tra c and can even be used for simulating DOS style attacks. Using nping, we generate
tra c going to and from each end device, including designated malicious devices. This allows us to test the flow rule
enforcement and ensure network security.
In order to compare the e ciency of the proposed architecture against traditional implementations, we generate
tra c in GNS3 using simulated delay. We’ve approximated real world delay between devices within a LAN and
devices in a cloud in order to highlight the performance gain of fog-based enforcement.
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Chapter 5
Results
Our proof of concept test bench on GNS3 consisted of a cloud based management layer overseeing two fog nodes,
each with two end devices. Our fist step was verifying behavior in order to ensure we had a functional system. We
used our python CLI to propagate new rules onto ODL, which correctly configured Openflow table 0 for each fog
node. The flows we entered allowed determined tra c based on matching IP addresses, dropping packets that were
not matched. This e↵ectively created a ’white list’ of devices which we could modify at will. We successfully allowed
tra c to flow between UbuntuDockerGuest1, 2, and 3, and blocked packets from UbuntuDockerGuest4 from entering
the network.
When moving from a physical testbed to a virtual one, we gained a few benefits and su↵ered from a few drawbacks.
However, our most important contribution is that we maintained low memory constraints. We created Lubuntu virtual
machines for our fog nodes which allow us to emulate our Intel NUCs. Lubuntu is a lightweight distribution of Ubuntu,
with a limited number of applications and packages. Lubuntu runs fast on bare bone computers, as it only requires 1
GB of RAM. Overall, we limited our memory usage to 3 GB of RAM per virtual machine (this included the Lubuntu
O.S.), since we installed minimal packages and software. Building a system that works with our hardware constraints
was one of the main focuses of our research.
One large drawback of working virtually was that we lost the testing capabilities available to us on physical
hardware, which includes numbers like latency. We instead made assumptions for latency based on our network
topology and generally accepted research for how certain pieces should perform. For our end devices, we assume
a direct, one hop connection to our fog node, which would max out at 100ms in the worst case. This is compared
to a private cloud control system which on average requires multiple hops and the average latency is in the order of
tens/hundreds of ms.
We limited ourselves to the use of open source software. This eliminates the cost of software, making the proposed
solution both adaptable for large scale networks and viable for small testbeds by eliminating what may otherwise be
a steep barrier of entry. The hardware and accessories we purchased for the initial system totaled to less than $650,
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Private Cloud Network Hub Solution
Ram Usage High Similar to fog node 2 GB for cloud1.2 GB /fog node
Latency Tens/hundreds of ms(depends on cloud location) <100 ms <100 ms
Accessibility Varies Varies Open Source
Scalability Yes No Yes
Table 5.1: Comparing proposed system to other related solutions.
however there are cheaper mini PCs on the market that would work given proof-of-concept implementation’s low
memory usage.
We utilized limited resources to build this network, but it can be scaled while maintaining low power consumption
and low memory utilization. A full comparison between the network hub solution, private cloud control solution, and
our SDN solution, can be seen in Figure 3.2.
One added benefit of the proposed solution comes from the CLI. Users can use the CLI without in depth knowl-
edge of ODL and OvS. Although there is a learning curve when utilizing any new software or package, our CLI
interface automates and simplifies and automates various aspects of SDN administration using ODL and Ovs. Users
will still need to configure their components for the proposed system. However, we hope that our instructions and
documentation make setting up the proposed system on a network both quick and stress-free.
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Chapter 6
Future Work
In the future, we would like to explore intent-based networking in order to make deployment, configuration, and
management easier for the network admin. The first step is to expand the functionality of groups to grouping end
devices, regardless of the fog node they belong to. This would allow us to group together end devices that have similar
permissions or function. A network admin would then be able to manage these devices as a group, regardless of
physical location. Additionally, we would like to be able to give fog nodes the ability to automatically group certain
devices based on defined parameters, like manufacturer type, open ports, or other unique characteristics that would be
relevant.
In addition to ease of use, security is one of our top priorities for this research. This means in future work, adding
a fog node to a cloud manager should happen securely, preventing malicious actors from masquerading as a fog node
and intercepting end device tra c. Another security improvement we’d like to make is the encryption of all command
and control tra c between fog nodes, the cloud manager, and the network admin. This would prevent eavesdropping
on tra c as well as sending fake control signals to the cloud manager.
In order to further improve on the performance gains we see with the proposed solution, we plan on using the data
plane development kit (DPDK) on the fog nodes, so that tra c flowing to and from end devices can be switched faster.
DPDK allows OvS to bypass the kernel and interact directly with the NIC on the fog nodes. This greatly expedites
packet switching and leads to even more optimizations we can make in the future around OvS and the fog nodes.
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Chapter 7
Considerations
The proposed system makes considerations toward humanitarian goals, specifically looking to bring value toward
ethical, economical, and sustainable matters. We are motivated to improve the security of large scale IoT networks,
but the fundamentals of the proposed system can be applied to other security issues. As a result, we hope that the
proposed solution will be an open resource helping to advance security platforms in a variety of contexts, not just
corporate ones.
7.1 Ethical
The proposed system secures data within networks that host vulnerable devices that otherwise could not be properly
protected. Our team sees data privacy as a human right, and the proposed system aims to provide this right to all people
through data protection. Companies can use the proposed system’s techniques to protect consumer data at scale, or,
the proposed system can be implemented in a home network, on a smaller and more personal scale.
7.2 Economic
In developing the proposed system our team wanted it to be accessible to a wide range of audiences, and reduce
the barriers to data protection and security. As a result, our team did not want financial considerations to prevent
consumers from using the proposed system. Therefore, we limited ourselves to the use of open source technology.
Additionally, we took a bare bones approach to software usage, installing only a minimal number of packages. This
allows us to limit RAM usage, making it so that the proposed system can be deployed on cheap hardware.
7.3 Sustainability
Reducing memory usage to a minimum means we also lower energy consumption in the proposed system. This
becomes especially important in large scale systems where thousands of devices use power. Reducing energy con-
sumption is better for the envrionment, and key if we want to continue to expand systems in a way that can the planet
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can handle sustainably. In addition, the proposed system’s generic and minimal hardware requirements allow low cost,
and potentially older, infrastructure to be used. This means consumers can use re-purpose old hardware for this system
instead of buying all new equipment and throwing old hardware away.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
By combining the benefits of the private cloud control and of local network hub architectures, the proposed solution
acts as a hybrid system that can secure IoT devices in a large scale setting. By using an SDN controller, such as
Open Daylight, in a cloud-based management layer, network admins have the ability to constantly monitor and change
policies in local firewalls, in real time. With a programmable switch, such as Open vSwitch, there is security one hop
away from each IoT device. The use of these technologies reinforces that it is both feasible and e↵ective to bring SDN
concepts to an IoT context. Through implementing a proof-of-concept, we show it is possible to build the proposed
system using low cost hardware and open source software.
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